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Introduction 
 
In his 1997 state of the nation address to parliament, Boris Yeltsin expressed 
concern that the course of political and economic change in Russia has been 
subverted by the failure to develop state autonomy and capacity. The state, he 
argued was too often at the service of a narrow set of private interests and as a 
consequence post-communist transformation was stymied (Rossiiskie vesti, 11 March 
1997). Yeltsin’s admission of the failings of the Russian state was soon followed by 
both a practical demonstration of its weakness - the 1998 economic crisis – and a raft 
of papers and books, which sought to analyse the failings of Russia in terms of state 
debility.1 The importance of the state as a subject of political analysis and as an 
agent of change was confirmed by Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and his 
commitment to rebuild the power of the state. Russia’s ‘historical experience’,  Putin 
(1999) argued, ‘bears witness to the fact that a country like Russia can live and 
develop within its existing borders only if it is a powerful state’ (see also Putin,  
2003;  for analysis of Putin's treatment of the state see Remington, 2000; Taylor, 
2003; Hashim, 2005; Pravda, 2005, Chadaev, 2006).  
                                                        
1 Early attempts to deal with the Russian state as a problem in post-communist transition 
were made by McFaul, 1995 and Stavrakis, 1993, but the mass of the literature on the 
Russian state appeared after the late 1990s: McFaul, 1998; Bova, 1999; Ma, 2000; Peregrudov 
et al, 1999; Roberts and Sherlock, 1999; Robinson, 2002; Smith, 1999; Sperling, 2000a; 
Beissinger and Young, 2002; Colton and Holmes, 2006; Hedlund, 2006.  
Abstract 
The Russian state at the end of the Yeltsin period was supposedly so 
emasculated that it had no potential to revive itself. But revive itself it 
has in some measure and this requires some explanation. This paper 
tries to illustrate how we might more profitably conceptualise state and 
regime building in Russia and argues that Russia has far from finished 
either state or regime building. It argues that the problem with most 
past efforts at analysing the development of the Russian state is that 
they have not distinguished between regime and state, and the 
different pressures to, and possibilities for, building either. It reviews 
and seeks to improve on an approach to conceptualising post-
communist state development and apply this to Russia. The paper 
analyses Russia’s recent political development to show its unsettled 
pattern of regime and state building, and looks at how other post-Soviet 
states have had more settled patterns of regime and state building than 
Russia and what this means. The paper concludes that we should be 
cautious about the future of the Russian state and should recognise that 
the pressures of state building in Russia mean that current patterns of 
political development may prove as susceptible to change as those that 
preceded them 
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Unfortunately, despite the attention paid to it since the late 1990s both analytically 
and in Russian political discourse, the problem of the Russian state has not been 
solved either practically or academically. Despite the attention paid to it state 
construction remains a live item on Russia’s political agenda and there has been 
little scholarly effort to look at how the issue of state building relates to the overall 
processes of political and economic change in Russia, and in particular to the issue 
of how far political power under Putin was consolidated into a stable political 
regime. This paper tries to illustrate how we might more profitably conceptualise 
the issue of state building in Russia and its relationship to the related process of 
regime building, and argues that Russia has far from finished either state or regime 
building. The overall goal is to be able to say something about the dynamics of 
Russian politics. Both state and regime building are processes and part of the 
dynamism of Russian politics is in their interaction. Whilst it is useful to 
occasionally take stock and look at how democratic or not Russia is, to engage in 
this type of regime analysis without looking at what creates regime and state 
building pressures is to miss an important aspect of political development 
processes.  
 
The paper works towards an understanding of the dynamism of Russian politics by 
first briefly critiquing some of the ways that the state was dealt with in the Yeltsin 
and Putin periods. It argues that the problem with most past efforts at analysing the 
development of the Russian and post-communist state is that they have not 
distinguished between regime and state, and the different pressures and 
possibilities of building either. As a result, they have not been able to account for 
certain aspects of change, or have only been able to look at change negatively, 
making arguments about what will not happen (or not happen simply), rather than 
allowing for a wide range of possible developmental processes and outcomes. The 
paper goes on from this critique to argue that Russia has had a very unsettled 
pattern of state and regime formation. Regime building has predominated over 
state building, but this in turn has helped force fresh efforts at state-regime building 
and (so far unsuccessful) reconciliation of the two processes. Some flesh is put on 
this argument in the last part of the paper which analyses Russia’s broad political 
development to show its unsettled pattern of regime and state building, and looks 
comparatively at how other post-Soviet states have had more settled patterns of 
regime and state building than Russia and what this means for the stability of the 
interaction between state and regime building in Russia. The paper concludes by 
arguing that we should be cautious about the future of the Russian state even as its 
power seems to have grown under Putin, and should recognise that the pressures of 
state building in Russia mean that current patterns of political development may 
prove as susceptible to change as those that preceded them. 
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State, regime and the analysis of Russian politics 
 
A basic problem for any analysis of the state is to distinguish between state and 
regime. This stumbling block is especially tricky in transitional systems where there 
is no tradition of constitutionalism and constitutional development that enables one 
to distinguish between state, regime and government: the locus of power, the rules 
and limitations governing its use, and particular constellations of political actors 
using power (Lawson, 1993). Moreover, in post-communist transitional systems 
both regime and state are in the process of reconstruction at the same time and are 
mutually constitutive so that distinguishing them is especially problematic 
(Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2002). However, the fact that state and regime 
are hard to separate and therefore have to be analysed together for much of the time 
does not mean that the two should be treated as identical. This has been a 
significant problem in most analysis of the Russian state. In particular emergent 
regime characteristics have been labelled as characteristics of the state and signs of 
incipient regime stabilisation have, no matter how temporary, been taken as signs 
that the state and state power (roughly an aggregate of its capacity, organisational 
integrity and autonomy) are developing a particular form. 
 
These problems are very evident in the work that looked at the Russian state at the 
end of the Yeltsin period. These works, although valuable because they were among 
the first to recognise the importance of the state in Russia as a problem of political 
and economic transformation, tended to try to identify what kind of state Russia 
had rather than looking at what pressures and factors were influencing the 
evolution of the Russian state. This was because they looked at the Russian state 
through the lens of a democratisation paradigm. It did not matter whether these 
paradigms were explicitly based on transitology or if they were implicit because the 
research question was is Russia becoming a democracy. In either case the concept of 
state was undertheorised. Traditionally, the state has not been a significant and 
distinct analytical category in much of the literature on democracy. Instead, much 
of the literature has just made an implicit recognition that a particular form of state 
autonomy (a separation of formal decision-making from powerful social interests2) 
                                                        
2 Occasionally this is explicitly recognised as in the work of Rueschemyer et al (1992), but 
for the most part state autonomy has been subsumed in other concepts. For example, the 
idea at the heart of many notions of democratic consolidation – that democratic citizenship 
is constructed as elites subject their interests to uncertainty and accept losses and gains 
derived from fluctuations in electoral fortune – is concerned with state autonomy. 
Democratic citizenship in this formulation is, in effect, the separation of formal decision-
making from the general structure of social inequality; elites no longer insure political 
outcomes favourable to themselves by virtue of their possession of economic and political 
resources, but accept that decision-making takes place in a sphere autonomous of particular 
social influences (cf. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1986 and 1988). 
Alternatively, the idea that democratic consolidation is a process of institutionalising agency 
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and stateness (that is some degree of national unity and/or Weberian territorial 
monopoly over violence,, cf. Rustow, 1970; Linz and Stepan, 1996) are necessary 
conditions for democratic consolidation. Viewing the Russian state through a 
democratisation paradigm did not, therefore, add much to the study of the state per 
se. It did point out the necessity of rebuilding state power and administrative 
capacity to sustain democracy, something that was a useful corrective to the anti-
state position that had been fashionable amongst proponents of radical economic 
reform in the early 1990s when it was assumed that the post-Soviet state was 
overdeveloped and needed to be reined back (see the critiques of this position in 
Stavrakis, 1993; Holmes, 1996). But overall, weak democracy and weak state were 
presented as parallel, mutually explicable developments in post-communist Russia; 
democracy failed because the state failed and the factors that explained the failure 
of democracy also explained why the state was a failure (Bova, 1999; Hoffman, 1998; 
Sakwa, 1997 and 2000). For example, the list of obstacles to developing state 
capacity that Sperling (2000b, 7) lists in the introduction to her edited volume on the 
Russian state are the same faults that were commonly seen to be blocking 
democratisation in the Yeltsin period independently of any failing of, or by, the 
state: oligarchy, personalism, corruption, underdevelopment of civil society, weak 
economy, ambiguity in the ‘citizenship boundaries of the Russian state’. etc.  
 
The conflation of state and regime in analysis during the later Yeltsin years thus 
presented a bleak picture of Russian political development and its prospects. The 
general expectation it led to at the end of Yeltsin’s term was that there would be 
very little change in Russia; the most powerful social groups were against change 
and had a monopoly over effective political action due to their economic power, or 
control over Russia’s regions (Treisman, 1999). In the terms of one seminal article on 
patterns of post-communist reform, the ‘winners’ of Russia’s transition had ‘taken 
all’ and left Russia a paradigmatic example of a system stuck in a ‘partial reform 
equilibrium’ in which political authorities – elected or bureaucratic – are unable to 
                                                                                                                                                            
through which the rules that govern political and distributional conflicts become immune 
from conflict is a matter of building state autonomy. On what Elster et al. call its ‘vertical’ 
dimension, institutionalising agency requires that elites accept fundamental political rules 
and do not try to change them when they do not guarantee that political outcomes are in 
elite interests. On its ‘horizontal’ dimension, the institutionalisation of agency requires that 
institutional competencies are in large measure inviolate, insulated from influence by actors 
who have power by virtue of possessing resources. See Elster, et al., 1998: 28. In short, 
democratic consolidation requires that power is not fungible, or is only fungible within 
limits and with limited, and rectifiable, effect so that there are spheres of public policy 
where the state is able to act autonomously.   
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use public administration to deliver public goods through further reform (Hellman, 
1998).3  
 
The analytical conflation of state and regime in Russia at the end of the Yeltsin 
period was thus quite clear - and quite right - in predicting that Russia was not 
going to develop as a democracy at least soon or easily. However, the conflation of 
state and regime meant that analysis could not make any finer judgements than 
this. Since state and regime were so tied up with one another there was no chance of 
identifying pressures or possibilities for change from within, or being forced 
externally on, the state or regime or both, or even to imagine that there was a 
possibility for change. Stagnation (at least) seemed locked in by their mutual 
weakness. But change came very quickly after Yeltsin’s departure at the end of 
1999. A new Chechen war, a change in the party system in the 1999 electoral cycle 
that was then consolidated in the 2003 cycle and by the further weakening of the 
main opposition party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, facilitated 
the deployment of central administrative resources in parliamentary and regional 
elections, and the cycling of popularity at the polls to increase presidential personal 
power for Putin (Smyth, 2002; March, 2004). This was then used by Putin from 2000 
to assault regional power and the oligarchs (Hyde, 2001; Shlapentokh, 2004), 
increase central authorities’ share of taxes (Easter, 2006), and to develop state power 
in the economy to alter the contours of the ‘oligarchic capitalism’ of the Yeltsin 
period (Mukhin, 2001; Radygin, 2004).  
 
Quite clearly, therefore, and despite what appeared to be a mutually reinforcing 
debility of state and regime at the end of the Yeltsin period, there were pressures on 
Russian political actors that enabled or drove them to make changes. But these 
developments were largely a surprise because of the way that state and regime 
were analytically seen as intertwined under Yeltsin. These developments have not 
led to a re-evaluation of the relationship between state and regime, however, and in 
particular, it has not led to their analytical separation to see what their relationship 
is. Instead the assumption has often been that the strengthening of ‘central’ power 
under Putin has been both state and regime building. The problem is the inverse of 
that which afflicted analysis under Yeltsin: then the weak state made for a weak 
democratic regime, and a weak democratic regime made for a weak state. Under 
Putin what appears to be growing state strength is read as a sign of regime strength, 
or vice versa. This has not lead to any more stable a sense of what the relationship is 
between state and regime building but to a proliferation of terms that have a short 
life-span to describe each. The description of Russia as a bureaucratic-authoritarian 
                                                        
3 On Russia as a classic case of partial reform see Roberts and Sherlock, 1999; Solnick, 1999; 
Bunce, 2000; Gordon, 2000; Kubicek, 2000. For a critique of the partial reform equilibrium 
thesis see Robinson, 2001; Colton, 2006. 
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system by Lilia Shevtsova and her subsequent abandonment of the concept is a case 
in point; the problem of conflating regime and state can affect even the most astute 
analyst. Shevtsova (2005, 324) used the term bureaucratic-authoritarianism, which 
describes a state formation, a product of structural pressures created by economic 
dependency that call in to existence a particular form of developmental state to 
manage the tensions between domestic and internationalised economic sectors, to 
describe features of the Putin regime, its weakening of democracy, its use of the 
bureaucracy as a support base, and its calls for modernisation. A conceptual 
definition of a state form was thus used to classify a regime based on two of its 
characteristics and without seeing if the causes of more authoritarianism, more 
reliance on bureaucracy and more modernisation (which are not exclusive to 
bureaucratic-authoritarian states), and the particular outcomes of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism applied in Russia. Arguably they did not, or if they did they did so 
in a very weak and superficial form and were soon supplanted by other factors that 
shaped the state’s management of the economy, and so Shevtsova (2007) rapidly 
put the label bureaucratic authoritarian to one side. 
 
Separating post-communist states and regimes (and bringing them 
back together again) 
 
The problems of analysing state and regime in the Yeltsin and Putin periods show 
that we need to look at the interplay of state and regime building, rather than accept 
them as essentially identical processes. The easiest way to do this is to go back to 
basics and think the problem through from the bottom up. One starting point is to 
recognise that state building and regime building may have different criteria for 
success and failure, and need not be complementary even if they affect one another. 
Very simply, a regime may be consolidated when elites achieve a set of political 
rules that they cannot change without incurring a disproportionate cost to 
themselves. A state formation is consolidated when officials have the ability and 
resources to perform state functions of maintaining order and security. The 
consolidation of a state formation in post-communism is potentially a far more 
difficult thing to achieve than the consolidation of a regime since managing the 
classic state functions of social order and national security involves questions of 
borders, citizenship, and the establishment of new forms of economic exchange and 
rules to govern them. A regime may be consolidated before a state develops that 
can resolve the problems of post-communist reconstruction and fulfil the classic 
functions of a state easily. If this occurs, the question before a regime is can it 
contain and ameliorate the problems of reconstruction and maintaining social order 
and national security in such a way that it can survive ruling through a weak (i.e., 
one that cannot resolve post-communist transformation or traditional state tasks) 
state? If a regime cannot contain or ameliorate these pressures some other way (for 
example by gaining aid or security guarantees from other states) then it will come 
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under pressure to evolve further and to develop the state. Where this pressure 
exists and is not responded to the long-term viability of a regime will be open to 
question. The viability of a regime in these circumstances may be called to question 
from below or from within the state as pressure to take action grows in reaction to 
perceived threats to the interests of state officials and to their ability to perform 
basic state functions of maintaining order and security.  
 
The essential difference between state and regime therefore, is that state formation 
is not just a matter of elite competition whereas in the short-term regime formation 
may be just that, a matter of elite struggle during which elites may or may not, 
according to circumstance, respond to or ignore state-building pressures. States as 
functional (albeit unconscious) structures have some interest autonomous of elites, 
in particular they have an interest in international competition and domestic order, 
and this makes them, in Skocpol’s (1979, 27) classic formulation, an ‘autonomous 
structure - a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily 
equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full 
set of member groups in the polity’. The degree to which states are autonomous 
‘can come and go’, as Skocpol (1984, 14) later put it, since the structural potential for 
autonomous action - as well as stimulus for it – can vary over time and from state 
sector to state sector. Seeing the state as an autonomous structure does not impose 
unity or intentionality on it; pressure to change can come from one, few, or all of a 
state’s composite officials and institutions, or be brought to bear on them from 
society. But no matter where the pressure comes from, state formation involves 
first, more complex tasks of social and economic management than regime 
formation; keeping order generally requires organisation and resources additional 
to those needed to keep order among competing elites, and gathering these 
resources may strain elite agreements about the economic basis of a regime. And 
second, state formation has an international dimension to it that is structural. 
Traditional security concerns – real and perceived - are still an issue in many parts 
of the post-communist world, and states still need to develop as military and 
extractive structures to cope with security demands. This creates pressures for state 
development. Where these pressures are absent is equally telling, since if such 
pressures are absent, there is a possibility that a regime might develop without 
having to pay much attention to state development. This would mean that state and 
regime might be stable, despite state weakness and inability to deal with 
transformation tasks. 
 
Regime stability is thus shaped by state building but in the short-run regime 
formation primarily involves elites and is determined by their interaction, the 
pressures upon them and the environment in which they interact. Regime building 
may overlap with state building as an elite may try to prop up its preferred regime 
by delivering greater state capacity and public goods. Alternately, regime building 
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might substitute for state building as elites capture rather than develop the state. 
Both strategies can be successful but over the longer term, the better developed a 
state the more likely there is to government stability and hence regime stability 
since continuity of governments, or at least their regularised replacement, is less 
likely to call into question the basis on which power is accessed and used. How long 
this ‘long term’ is depends on the pressures that a country has to deal with. Where 
pressures are great supplanting regime for state building will be dangerous, 
especially if the state has low capacity to begin with. A regime in a state with high 
capacity has more resources to deploy, better chances of extracting extra resources 
to deal with problems, and potentially more and broader reserves of political 
loyalty to fall back on because it is able to deliver a wider range of public goods 
through the state. Moreover, there is less chance of political fragmentation if the 
delivery of these goods is not directly from the regime but is filtered through a state 
with capacity rather than delivered through some faction of a regime. Where states 
deliver public goods they can be rationed in times of crisis or shortage; where 
delivery of goods is personalised through connection to the regime there is more 
chance of political contestation because power within a regime depends on the 
ability to deliver resources so that they become objects of struggle between regime 
groups or unevenly distributed so that regime legitimacy declines. 
 
The first question that arises from this is what influences regime building in the 
short run if over the longer term a regime’s durability will reflect its ability to 
construct a level of state capacity adequate to deal with the tasks it faces. Grzymala-
Busse and Jones Luong (2002, 537-38) argue that elite competition over regime 
formation is constrained and configured in particular by the ‘agents to whom the 
competitors are accountable and the institutional means through which competition 
takes place’ (see also Gel’man, 2007). Accountability, or lack thereof, makes for 
either representative competition, in which elites act as entrepreneurial 
representatives of social organisations, or for competition between self-contained 
elites, which are isolated from society and compete with no ‘reference or appeal to 
outside groups or constituencies and no explicit or organised social support base’. 
The institutional means through which elite competition takes place are via formal 
or informal channels, which are distinguished by the extent to which political 
competition is ‘codified and depersonalised or discretionary and personalised’ 
(Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2002, 538-39). Legacies from communism 
determine the particular type of regime formation that any post-communist country 
develops. These shape elites and the institutional arenas in which they compete. 
Regime formation processes are thus path dependent. Regime building was 
influenced by the extent to which, first, there was structured popular mobilisation 
at the onset of post-communism that could act as a check on elite behaviour and 
serve as a resource that could, at the cost of maintaining support, be mobilised in 
the course of elite struggle, and second, how far there were well-developed central 
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political institutions in existence at this time that could be used by elites and which 
created a framework for them to compete within. Where there was social 
mobilisation, elites would be representative; where there was none, they would be 
self-contained. Where there were well-developed central political institutions, elites 
would compete through formal institutions; where there was none, they would 
compete through informal channels. The rapidity of change magnified the impact of 
these factors. Coping with the pace and scale of change created incentives to use 
existing institutions, formal and informal, and to concentrate effort on competition 
with other elites through social organisations if such existed as a communist legacy, 
or without engaging society, if society was passive as a result of communism. 
Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong use these variables to create four ‘ideal types’ of 
regime formation process (summarised in Table 1: where self-contained elites 
compete through formal channels, the regime formation process has been 
autocratic; where they compete through informal channels, it has been personalistic. 
Where representative elites compete through formal channels, regime formation has 
been democratic; where they compete through informal channels it has been 
fractious.  
 
Table 1: Gryzmala-Busse and Jones Luong typology of regime formation 
 
 Who competes 
 
Self-contained elites Representative elites 
 
 
 
How 
they 
compete? 
 
Primarily 
through 
formal 
channels 
 
 
AUTOCRATIC 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC 
 
Primarily 
through 
informal 
networks 
 
 
PERSONALISTIC 
 
 
FRACTIOUS 
 
Source: Adapted from Grzymala-Busse and Luong Jones, 2002, 544. 
 
 
The Grzymala-Busse and Luong Jones schema gives us a way of distinguishing 
between regime formation pathways that we can use to assess the stability of 
regime formation. No polity will fit exactly to any one of their types since they are 
ideal-types   created to help identify real world process rather than something that 
exists empirically anywhere in reality (Weber, 1949: 90-2). The more a polity 
contains aspects of more than one of the four ideal types and the greater the tension 
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between them, the less stable regime formation will be since they are mutually 
exclusive. We can relate this to state building by looking at the relationship between 
unstable regime building (the degree to which Grzymala-Busse and Luong Jones’s 
ideal types overlap and conflict in reality) and the extent to which there is pressure 
on a polity to develop state capacity. This pressure might be high (for example a 
state might be threatened or need to develop economically to forestall social order 
problems), low because a state has high capacity, or low because a regime is able to 
avoid dealing with state building issues. The basic pattern of interactions between 
pressure to build states and the stability of regime building are summarised in 
Table 2. Regime building can be either conflictive, where there is competition 
between elites over the means and ends of regime building because there is a 
conflict between different types of elite (representative versus self-contained) 
and/or over how the regime should work, through formal or informal institutions, 
or consensual, that is closer to one of the four ideal-types identified by Grzymala-
Busse and Jones Luong. Pressure to state build, i.e. to change the way in which the 
state manages society, to improve its efficiency as a resource collector by lessening 
corruption or improving tax collection, to improve its ability to develop policies for 
economic growth and provide domestic and international security etc, can be high 
or low 
 
Since all states – except those that have failed - have some measure of capacity 
pressure interacts with existing initial levels of capacity as well as regime building. 
The inherited levels of state capacity can either be sufficient or insufficient to deal 
with the transformational tasks of post-communism and traditional state functions. 
As Table 2 shows, this gives three possible combinations: low pressure to state build 
with sufficient or insufficient initial state capacity, and high pressure with 
insufficient state capacity. These are combined in Table 2 to give six different ideal-
typical patterns of regime and state building. In none of the patterns in Table 2 is a 
build up of state capacity guaranteed to take place; that will depend on the 
calculation of politicians over the costs of reform to them and the benefits that may 
accrue to oppositional forces from reform and the disruption it causes (Geddes, 
1994).  Nor are efforts at building up the state guaranteed to work; that depends on 
a raft of factors including design and circumstance. No country will fit a pattern 
perfectly; they cannot as the patterns are ideal-typical. However, it is obviously 
best, where circumstance allows, for elites to try to move from left to right across 
the columns of Table 2 (from Cell A to D, B to E, C to F) both to resolve regime 
conflict and to preserve what capacity and resources already exist, and also to move 
from the bottom right cells ( E and F) of Table 2 to the top (cell D), that is to a the 
state further. The chances of making such movements, with whatever kind of 
regime that is built, democratic or despotic, will be very different according to 
starting point and the intensity of conflict and consensus that exists over a regime. 
The higher the extent of conflict the less likely a case will be to move left to right 
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and bottom to top, and the greater the extent of consensus the easier it will be to 
move closer to the ideal-type at the top right of Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Patterns of regime and state building 
 
 
 
 
 Regime building process 
Conflictive Consensual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure 
to build 
state and 
levels of 
state 
capacity 
 
Low pressure and 
sufficient state 
capacity 
 
(relatively high state 
capacity at onset of 
post-communism, 
ability to deal with 
transformational and 
other state functions) 
 
Cell A: unstable 
regime. Attrition of 
state capacity until 
elite resolve regime 
question.  
 
Cell D: regime stability. 
Maintenance (at least) of 
inherited capacity. 
 
 
High pressure and 
insufficient state 
capacity 
 
(relatively low state 
capacity at onset not 
enough to deal with 
transformational or 
other tasks, not 
possible to ignore 
them) 
 
Cell B: unstable 
regime. Attrition of 
state capacity unless 
elite resolve regime 
question. Difficulty of 
simultaneous regime 
stabilisation and state 
building complicates 
both. 
 
Cell E: regime stability can 
lead to state building but 
enormity of state building 
might impact on regime 
stability depending on 
policy mix. Ability to 
develop state capacity 
dependent on policy 
choices; regime stability 
may give time to find good 
policy mix. 
 
 
Low pressure and 
insufficient state 
capacity  
 
(relatively low state 
capacity at onset of 
post-communism, 
pressure to deal with 
transformational and 
other state functions 
weak) 
 
Cell C: unstable 
regime. Attrition of 
state capacity unless 
and until elites resolve 
regime question.  
 
 Cell F: regime stabilisation 
substitutes for state 
building, state capacity 
remains low.  
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Russia’s regime and state building pattern 
 
It is, therefore, possible to think of regime and state building as related but different 
processes if we think about whether or not they have the same conditions for 
success. When we do this, and when we appreciate that different regimes may be 
under different amounts of pressure to state build and may or may not have 
problems stabilising regimes, we can identify a basic set of patterns of state and 
regime building and their interaction. How does Russia fit into this schema? To 
answer this question we need to look at two things: the extent to which Russia has 
been under pressure to state build and the degree to which regime building has 
been conflictive. Looking at the latter of these issues means reviewing Russia’s 
recent political history and looking at the former means looking at how Russia has 
been subject to pressures to develop its state in comparison to other post-
communist and particularly post-Soviet states. When we do this we can see that 
Russia has spent most of its post-communist history with high pressure to develop 
state capacity and has only latterly dampened down conflict over regime formation. 
As a result, Russia has had a highly varied pattern of state-regime formation that is 
different to most other post-communist polities. Roughly, Russia has been stuck for 
most of its post-communist history in the middle of Table 2, close to the ideal-type 
in Cell B, with high pressure to develop state capacity and regime instability. We 
can see this if we compare Russia to other post-communist states. Putin’s aspiration 
has been to move Russia ‘to the right’ in Table 2, from close to the Cell B ideal-type 
to E ideal-type, to settle regime stability in order to create state capacity and deal 
with transformational problems and to deal with issues of national security in a 
sustainable fashion (hence reaching something like the Cell D ideal-type). The 
danger is that Russia will, for a variety of factors, hover between the ideal-types of 
cells B, E and F. 
 
Assessing the extent to which a state is under pressure to build state capacity is a 
complicated and imprecise business since external perception of what constitutes 
pressure to state build might not actually be considered a state building pressure by 
actors themselves. We can, however, see whether Russia was stable in its pattern of 
regime development and exposed to more pressures to state build than other post-
Soviet states and thus get an idea of the extent of pressure to state build through 
comparison. In contrast to Russia, most other post-communist countries have been 
able to construct state and regimes that support one another. In East Central Europe 
the spread of democracy has, at different speeds and with varying degrees of 
difficulty, created states with a degree of capacity that is derived from the 
legitimacy of the democratic regimes that they have created. East Central European 
states therefore developed the means to deal with post-communist transformation 
tasks and international competition, especially after the prospect of rejoining 
Europe began to take shape and resources began to flow from Europe. In the terms 
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of Table 2, much of post-communist Eastern Europe would have been closer 
(obviously with some great variation across the region) to the right hand column as 
regime building was fairly stable, or became so relatively quickly. In most of the 
rest of the former USSR, reform was either not a pressing issue (continuity was the 
pressing issue), or rapid state and regime failure through war and territorial 
division brought about regime change that quickly reinstated old elites or ended 
efforts at state formation via change.  
 
Either way, these countries were then less subject to change than Russia has been as 
elites consolidated themselves as self-contained entities, undermined democratic 
practices and either ruled directly through the formal institutions that they 
inherited, or supplemented them with neo-traditional networks. The continuity 
pattern was most prevalent in Central Asia and Belarus, state and regime failure 
and reconstitution of self-contained elites has been more apparent in Georgia 
(although it may now be flipping back), Moldova and Azerbaijan. These differences 
to Russia partially explain the basis for stability in these systems relative to Russia. 
There is a degree of inherent stability in continuity: forming a regime based on elite 
continuity with weak state capacity due to lack of change is stable, at least in the 
short-run, because of regime autonomy from society. This autonomy can be used to 
constrain political development through co-option and coercion to head off calls for 
change, and because the very weakness of the state in these cases blocks its 
development as an autonomous structure; regime is all there is and it is able to rest 
on despotic power. Additionally, continuity prevents certain kinds of problem from 
emerging. Firm control over the economy prevents elites from accessing resources, 
whether from the global economy or from the domestic economy, independently of 
the regime. Firm control and relative economic isolation limits exogenous pressure 
to reform, or reduces it to pressure that can be dealt with by the coercive 
reallocation of resources from, for example, welfare to debt repayment. Problems 
that require state capacity - such as balancing out growth between regions and 
sectors that are differently tied to the international economy – do not have to be 
faced in the short-run.  
  
 Inherent stability is not the full story, however. There are differences in how post-
Soviet states other than Russia have been able to manage resource collection 
without straining elite agreement about the economic basis of regimes, and in 
isolation from some developmental pressures that exist in Russia, and there are 
differences in how security has been managed and the need to develop states as 
military-extractive structures has been alleviated. These differences combine with 
and prop up the inherent stability that continuity in regime formation produces. 
They are also interactive; the ability to insure security rents facilitates avoidance of 
developing the state as a military-extractive structure, whilst inability to develop 
the state means that patterns of resource collection are locked in with security 
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dependencies. The patterns that these factors take are very different across the post-
Soviet space (Robinson, 2004a and b). The first divide is between those states that 
have complex economies and are not reliant on one or two key imports, and those 
states that are more classic rentiers in their dependence on energy and primary 
product sales. The latter have developed patrimonial and personalistic regimes to a 
greater extent than the former. Energy rents have been the main source of 
patrimonial and personalistic power, although in some states, most notably 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, considerable rents have accrued from cotton as well, 
or from other forms of mineral wealth such as gold in Kyrgyzstan. There is 
obviously a high degree of variance between the extents that energy sales contribute 
rent across the CIS (Esanov, et al, 2001). In Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, energy rents have been very high as a proportion of GDP. In Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan, these rents have gone to government directly and then been 
redistributed (sometimes). In Uzbekistan, where large rents were also available 
from the cotton sector, they have been used to give subsidies to consumers, rather 
than accumulated as direct revenue flows to the state. Kazakhstan has taken 
revenue less from exports, but has compensated by allowing large FDI inflows into 
the energy sector. This strategy, shared by Azerbaijan, was a response to political 
threats, particularly regional divisions, and a lack of alternative rent sources. In 
order to quell potential threats and stimulate a rapid inflow of some resources from 
the one rent source that they had, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan privatised their 
energy sectors to create short-term rent flows that could more immediately be used 
for patronage (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2001).  
 
No matter how rent has been taken, the effect, roughly, has been the same: 
personalistic regimes have developed based on patrimonial power. The extent of 
personalistic regime development has varied. Where there has been more state 
control and less privatisation, the degree of authoritarianism has been more 
extensive. This pattern has produced authoritarian regimes in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, whilst the partial opening up of economies and competition over 
resources has produced illiberal, but not fully authoritarian, regimes in Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan (cf. Ishiyama, 2002). Either way, these regimes have been relatively 
stable. Subsidies have sometimes provided relief from pressure to develop the 
extractive capacity of the state in addition to resource rents and sometimes in place 
of them. Subsidies have taken various forms. A one-off subsidy was the gradual 
Russian shouldering of the USSR’s external debts. These had been shared out by 
CIS states in March 1992, but Russia took over responsibility for the debt to secure 
political goals in the CIS over the next few years. Russia’s energy exports to the CIS 
were also heavily discounted. Energy exports consistently make up on average 
about 40-50 per cent of Russian exports to the post-Soviet space . In the first years 
after independence, they achieved only 30-40 per cent of the world market price. 
The net result was a loss to Russia of about 12 per cent of GDP. Russian subsidies in 
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total amounted (at the lowest estimate) to 50 per cent of CIS countries’ GDP and 
cost US$17 billion (the highest estimate was US$67 billion). Further subsidies came 
through the rouble zone and bank credits from the Russian Central Bank. These 
were very significant, ranging from 90 per cent of GDP in the case of Tajikistan to 10 
per cent of GDP in Belarus (Ekonomika i zhizn’. 1996, 16, 1; Åslund, 1995, 123; van 
Selm, 1997, 108-10). Although many of these subsidies have been cut back over time 
they provided a window of opportunity in many states to stabilise their regimes 
independently of state formation. These regimes have then been able to replace 
some of their lost Russian subsidies with debt build-ups (the exception here being 
Belarus, which has continued to receive heavy trade subsidies and which has had 
virtually no foreign debt build-up). These debt build-ups have not stimulated state 
formation, however. Rather, the burden of debt has been passed on to their 
populations who have experienced downturns in living standards. 
 
Russia’s role as regional hegemon in place of the USSR makes it a source of security 
rent. The ability to take this rent is not universal in that Russian military 
involvement in some parts of the CIS is far from benign (Georgia, for example). The 
system of security rents is not institutionalised in the same way that it was for the 
Warsaw Pact. The CIS collective security arrangements have been far less successful 
or extensive than the old alliance system with the outer empire. However, post-
Soviet states have benefited from, first, guarantees about the stability of borders 
made as the USSR collapsed between the new partner states of the CIS, and second, 
from security cover and bilateral treaties with Moscow. Sometimes these 
arrangements have been explicit, as with the Russian presence in Tajikistan, the CIS 
agreements on collective security and peacekeeping, or the bilateral agreements 
with Belarus or Kyrgyzstan enabling Russian military use of facilities. However, 
even where there were no formal agreements, many post-Soviet states rested under 
Russia’s security cover because Russia has continued to be a regional hegemon 
sufficiently strong to prevent threats from other states, if not from small-scale 
insurgency. The extent of security rents, and what their removal might mean, is 
hard to gauge. However, elsewhere in the world the de jure recognition of statehood 
independent of a state’s ability to defend its sovereign status has clearly been 
related to a decline in economic regulation by elites. Where there is no military 
imperative to accumulate resources, elites are able to deploy rents that they control 
to private ends and need not involve themselves in developing other resource 
streams (Bates, 2001). Security rents therefore magnify the effect of rentierism and 
make its demise less likely. 
 
Economic and security factors have therefore served to shelter regime continuity 
and enabled weak states in the post-Soviet space, but not in Russia. Russia is a 
security provider and guarantor, rather than the recipient of security rents. 
Although the reach of its military power has contracted over the last decade, it still 
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has overseas bases and military commitments, and has not been able to restructure 
its armed forces or security profile to the extent that reform has called for (Barany, 
2001). The military budget has fallen but it remains a major expenditure and there is 
a gap between the monies allocated to the armed forces and their fiscal 
requirements if it is to restructure and play roles that Russian politicians want it too 
(Herspring, 2003). The Russian military thus exerts a dual fiscal pressure on the 
regime, a current one and a future one that will not diminish. Nor, for most of the 
1990s, was Russia able to avoid reform because of rent. Russia bore the brunt of the 
collapse of Soviet state revenues, a problem that was recognised even before the 
USSR collapsed and was one of the key issues that reform strategy and post-Soviet 
state building through economic reform was designed to deal with in its first stages 
(Birman, 1990, 25; Woodruff, 1999). Energy rents were small because private firms 
have replaced the state as the first beneficiary of export rents. This was a result of 
Russia’s initial reform policies and of Soviet policies in the energy sector. As Kim 
(2003) has argued, Soviet policies in the energy sector had created high transaction 
costs for state administrators that the Russian state could not afford in the early 
1990s; the Russian state therefore had to forego direct appropriation of rent. Initial 
reform policies both further diminished state capacity to administer the economy 
and created greater pressure on budgets so that selling of the oil industry, or at least 
parts of the production side of it, was a way of raising revenue at low 
administrative cost. It is only since the rise in oil prices post-1998 that Russia has 
been able to take levels of tax from the energy industry sufficient to relieve its 
budget deficit. Prior to 1999 Russia ran a budget deficit in the post-communist 
period of just under 5% of GDP a year (Tikhomirov, 2000, 51-2). 
 
In comparison with other post-communist and particularly post-Soviet states, we 
can see, therefore, that there has been a high and fairly consistent pressure in Russia 
to state build. The consequence of this has been that Russia has always been under 
pressure to reform from within itself as impending fiscal collapse has, until the last 
few years, been exacerbated by geopolitics and its relations with other states. Unlike 
them Russia neither had the degree of elite continuity nor the wherewithal to avoid 
efforts at building state capacity. The degree of fragmentation of its elite and the fact 
that it was under pressure to develop state capacity meant that state building 
projects and regime instability were both high in Russia. In Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong’s terms, Russia has had neither a self-contained nor representative 
elite, and elite competition has taken place through both formal and informal 
channels. The elite is neither self-contained nor representative because it has been 
forced, since Gorbachev’s reforms, to compete for power by making claims to be 
representative, but has not managed to give these claims any sociological or 
organisational depth. In the 1990s the signs of this were the weakness and 
transience of political parties on the one hand, which showed the shallowness of 
elite claims to deep popular support, and on the other hand, Yeltsin’s shoring up of 
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his rule by the incorporation of a broad cross-section of Russian elites. This 
demonstrated Yeltsin’s inability to construct a stable basis of support. The best that 
he could hope for and achieve was a temporary ‘relatively stable equilibrium’ 
between Russian political elites in the mid-1990s after the chaos of the early and 
later 1990s (Kuvaldin, 1998; Huskey, 1999, 218; Breslauer, 2002). Elites contested 
regime formation through formal and informal channels. There was a formal 
electoral contest over the character of the regime through referenda in the early 
1990s (over parliamentary/presidential powers), and elections (‘reform’ versus 
‘communism’). These contests were repeated down through the federal system to 
decide local regime characteristics. However, within the political system access to 
power was highly personalised and dependent on connections. The degree to which 
Yeltsin was able to isolate and control elite conflict varied so that he was never able 
to develop an efficient autocratic or personalistic regime. However, the limited 
purchase that parliament had on the presidency after 1993 meant that a democratic 
regime was also impossible to secure. Policy was made within the government and 
presidential apparatus and was shaped by personal interaction and Yeltsin’s dual 
goals of balancing factions within the government and presidential apparatus and 
giving himself room for manoeuvre.  
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Russia has experienced a series of attempts to build up 
state capacity and has used a range of different strategies to try to achieve its ends. 
In each case effort and strategy have been associated with a part of the state, in 
other words with a set of particular institutions controlled by a segment of the elite. 
The upshot of this is that state reform projects have been weakened by infighting 
and that there has been no satisfactory resolution to state formation. The first wave 
of state formation was economic, focussing on fiscal collapse, which was addressed 
by marketisation and attendant liberalisation. This failed because, inter alia, the 
section of the elite promoting it did not have the political capacity to make reform 
policies stick. Failure led to changes in the pattern of state building (which declined) 
and regime formation (which became more personalistic), but these changes 
brought no progress in developing the capacity of the state to fulfil its functions or 
of the Yeltsin regime to isolate itself from state building pressures. As a result, in the 
later Yeltsin period, the state sought to develop its revenue base by asset sales, 
short-term loans, by accessing international credit, and finally by enforcing tax 
collection (Robinson, 1999; Treisman, 1998). None of these policies worked, or 
worked well beyond a very short-term, because the state did not have the 
administrative capacity to control powerful economic groups from taking 
advantage of policy. The failure of these polices was behind the 1998 financial crisis. 
This crisis was then responsible for the turnover of governments in 1998 and 1999, 
and the emergence of Vladimir Putin. The Putin regime has been able to raise 
revenue thanks to high oil prices globally and the collapse of imports and 
stimulation of domestic production following the rouble devaluation of 1998. It has 
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2008, No. 3 
18 
 
also taken actions to try to gather the resources necessary to enable the state to deal 
with some of its basic functions. Some of these have been political, such as the 
attempts to curtail regional autonomy. Some have been matters of economic policy, 
such as the introduction of low flat-rate taxes, which have attempted to circumvent 
the state’s weak administrative capacity by simplifying economic administration. 
Some have been both economic and political, such as the actions against Yukos and 
Khodorkovsky that combine the extension of political control over both political 
activity and over resources.  
 
The basis for these actions has been the retained power of the state to organise 
coercion and use the judicial system, plus the power of the executive to organise a 
legislative agenda due to Putin’s popularity and the changes wrought by the 1999-
2000 and 2003-2004 electoral cycles. But this is not the same as having resolved the 
problem of the economic basis of the state nor is it the same as having resolved 
questions of regime building. There has obviously and undeniably been some shift 
in how power is divided between institutions and elites in Russia, and hence a 
change in the rules of the political game. Certainly, some of the characteristics of the 
regime have changed; ‘monocentric’ power has replaced multiple, overlapping and 
competing centres of power and influence at the apex of the political system (Zudin, 
2002); the ‘power vertical’ linking central and regional administrations has been re-
established (Gel’man, 2006a); ‘oligarchisation’ has been replaced with supposed 
‘equidistance’ (ravnoudalennost’) from economic elites (Rutland, 2003, 139; 
Kolesnikov, 2005); arguably, the influence of the old ‘party of power’ has declined 
and it has been replaced with a ‘new’ establishment drawn in particular from the 
power ministries (the silovki) (Kryshtanovskaya and White, 2003; Renz, 2006; Rivera 
and Rivera, 2006; Treisman, 2006). These changes have variously been labelled 
moves to authoritarianism, autocracy, or some form of hybrid regime such as 
‘guided’ or ‘managed’ democracy, or ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Brown, 2001; 
Colton and McFaul, 2003; Levitsky and Way, 2002). But how different is this to the 
hybridization that occurred under Yeltsin? The difference is perhaps quantitative 
rather than qualitative.  
 
What has happened under Putin has been an accentuation of the pattern of regime 
development rather than anything new. Putin’s style of rule, as Stoner-Weiss (2006, 
114) has pointed out, is the same as Yeltsin’s: like ‘Yeltsin before him, Putin has 
assiduously avoided official affiliation with any national political party, preferring 
instead to rule in a nontransparent fashion through a group of family members and 
longtime friends.’ Putin’s ability to accentuate the pattern of development has been 
a matter of luck, for example the good economic fortune that has come his way 
since 1999, the fragmentation of the Russian elite after 1999 that meant that 
opposition has been easier to pick off, and beneficial external political 
circumstances, for example the ‘Orange’ , ‘Rose’ and ‘Tulip’ revolutions that helped 
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Putin convince parts of the elite that managing political processes more tightly is in 
their interest (Ambrosio, 2007). The result – the authoritarianism of ‘managed’ 
democracy – reduces democracy even more since it has led to heightened control 
over effective media, and reduced much oppositional activity to what is at best a 
shell (Gel’man, 2005, 2006b), but it was not replacing a functioning democracy. 
Moreover, it is far from clear that these regime changes translate into changes in the 
state (Holmes, 2002). Empirically, change has been more rhetorical than actual as far 
as the state is concerned (Hashim, 2005).  What developed during Putin’s first term 
was the idea of the state and of a need for its ‘purpose and unity’. rather than an 
autonomous state (Sakwa, 2004: 237). The Russian state does not appear any better 
at providing public goods under Putin than it did under Yeltsin, is not any smaller 
and more efficient, is not any less corrupt, and its chief ‘achievement’, economic 
growth, is not the result of administrative change since the economic upturn 
predates Putin’s reforms, but of good fortune (Robinson, 2007; McFaul and Stoner-
Weiss, 2008; Nemtsov and Milov, 2008). Arguably Russia has moved from a 
situation close to the ideal-type of Cell B to one that resembles Cell F in Table 2: 
Putin has achieved some degree of consensus over the contours of Russia’s regime 
but so far this consensus has not lead to any great development of the state.  This 
leaves open more questions about Russia’s development than it answers: if pressure 
to state build becomes high again (because, for example declining demand for oil 
due to recession brings lower energy prices) can the regime that Putin has 
constructed move up from Cell F to E?  
 
Conclusion 
 
Russia still has a long way to go before state and regime are aligned and still has 
much to do to generate a state with both the capacity and organisational integrity to 
deal with the tasks both of transformation and of providing security and order. The 
reasons that Russia has had greater difficulty in consolidating regime and state are 
that it has not been able to dodge state formation in the same way that many of its 
fellow post-Soviet states have but has not had the advantages that East European 
states enjoyed. The changes under Vladimir Putin have primarily been changes in 
regime and have not yet reached a point where they can be said to have laid the 
political or economic basis for dealing with problems posed to the Russian state 
with a degree of certainty. Since the Russian state is still weak there may still be 
developments at both regime level and in future state formation because there is no 
capacity as yet to resolve problems and the regime is not able to completely avoid 
responding to crises that require state-level responses. The changes under Putin are 
therefore a weak response to the dual problems of regime instability and state 
building pressure. Pressure has eased because of the fiscal windfall from 
hydrocarbons and some of this money may be pumped in to beefing up the military 
and dealing with (hard) security issues. This leaves the prospects for further 
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development in Russia very open-ended. It remains to be seen if Putin’s efforts to 
stabilise regime building can endure his succession so that we can say that the 
regime has stabilised to some degree. It is clearly Putin’s hope that regime stability 
can, over time, be translated into state capacity so that Russia can develop a state 
that can deal with the high level of pressure for state development. The simplest 
development – indeed in many ways the one that was expected at the end of the 
Yeltsin era – would be for Russia to lapse back into regime instability and with 
continued strong pressure to state build that it cannot meet (back to Cell B). The 
largesse of Russia’s booming hydrocarbon economy complicates this, however, 
since it raises the possibility of a lowering of state building pressure with or without 
the continued level of control over the regime that Putin has achieved. The ability to 
sustain this situation over the long term depends, however, on either the continued 
flow of high energy revenues or the use of energy revenues to fund a Russian 
developmental state so that these revenues might eventually be offset. Which of 
these outcomes eventually transpires depends on the succession to Putin in the first 
instance, and the extent to which the succession allows the contradictions in the 
regime to interact with state building pressures and reshape Russian politics again. 
To allow for the various ways in which this might happen we should not think that 
Putin’s control is in anyway equivalent a build up of Russian state capacity nor that 
the development of authoritarian regime features means that the regime Putin has 
built is stable whilst  pressure for state development remains. 
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